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Dr. Segall's paper is a lucid reminder of how far away we
deviate from common sense and observation when we try to
uphold particular "scientific" consu·ucts. Two centuries after
Kant's demolition of the notion ofa pure account of nature
unfiltered by categories, it would seem unnecessary to
remind psychologists of the fallacy of taking a concept for
the phenomenon to which it refers, what Segall refers to as
the mistake of assuming that metaphors have "d1ing-hood."
It is paradoxical that in this so-called post-modernist era, an
era when modes of knO\\~ng are questioned or even reject-
ed, theoretical constructs such as dissociation, defense mech-
anisms, expectations, etc. are treated as things in themselves,
instead of as theoretical constructs based on partial per-
spectives.
In addition to his cri de coeur against reification, there
are many other areas ofagreement between Dr. Segall's posi-
tion and mine. Foremostis his discussion ofdissociative phe-
nomena as following both mechanistic and agentic processes.
It would be especially peculiar ifdissociative phenomena were
the exception to the norm, namely that most behaviors and
experiences can be evoked, appear unbidden, or be a mix-
ture of the two. An easy example: I can purposefully evoke
the presence of a person dear to me; at other times, exter-
nal or internal cues will bring a remembrance of that per-
son in what seems to be an unbidden way. Thus, even a gar-
den variety memory can be a "doing," a "happening," or a
mixture of the two. And even ifa memory happens "by itself,"
I can use volitional processes to linger on it, distract myself
£i'om it, and so on. Conversely, when I decide to evoke a mem-
ory, some aspects of it will appear "on their own," sometimes
surprising me.
In d1e clinical arena, patients have dissociative phe-
nomena "happen" to them (e.g., a PTSD patient who, when
hearing a cannon round, automatically ducked under,! car)
or they make them happen (e.g., in a memorable phrase,
another PTSD patient talked of purposefully "fleeing" from
himself when he is in a threatening situation). The same
applies even with "hard-wired" neurological conditions.
Individuals wid1 uncontrollable seizures can also induce them
162
by purposefully manipulating the sensory stimulation sur-
rounding them.
The rigid dichotomy between agency and automaticity
occurs more in the arena of concepts than in the arena of
experience, where inter- and intra-individual gradations in
the control and organization of consciousness are the norm
(see Natsoulas, 1984).
I am also in agreement with Dr. Segall's view of perfor-
mance and role-enactmentas potentially truthfi.11 and impor-
tant. The various analyses ofsocial roles, from WilliamJames
onwards, have already illustrated the various ways in which
we are what we perform, and vice versa. This is not to deny
the possibility of deception, understood as a deliberate act
in which the agent attempts to persuade him/herself or Od1-
ers, of something the agent knows to be false. But it is not
to deny either the possibility that what may start originally
as illusion or even self-deception may become an experien-
tial and physiological reality once the agent becomes
immersed in the illusion, as seen in artistic performance, the
evocation of emotions, hypnosis, and other phenomena.
(Cardena, 1996).
Having agreed with so much of what Dr. Segall has to
say, I will part company wid1 him on two issues. Toward the
end of his paper, he states d1at the process of s\\~tchingpro-
motes, or "intends" to promote, socio-biological adaptation.
I doubt that in every case switching, or any other dissocia-
tive or non-dissociative process, promotes adaptation. In fact,
one of the virtues ofJanet's model as compared with Freud's,
is that it does not have a requirement that dissociative pro-
cesses be intentional. They may be, but they do not have to
be. The advantage of a functionalist explanation (i.e., to
explain an event by the reputed function it may serve) is that
one can always find a possible function for any process. Its
disadvan tage? That one can always find a possible function
for any process.Jay Gould (1997) has explained why an exclu-
sive fi.mctionalistic/adaptationist position does not even work
in d1e biological realm and why current utility does not imply
an adaptive etiology. I would not expect otherwise in the psy-
chological realm.
My major disagreement with Dr. Segall, however, is in
his repeated dichotomy between metaphorical and scientif-
ic language. He states at one point that "metaphors may not
have an ultimate scientific truth value," and that "the actu-
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ality of a phenomenon transcends and eludes mctaphor, ~
etc. There arc IWO ;lIl~\\'crs to this point. First, a.s the influ-
cntial hiSlOri;m of science Kllhn (1970, p. 206) remarked.
-philosophers have no\\' abandoned the hope orachic\ing~
the ideal of a language.: cOn1>lnlch.:d of pure-sense data. In
his "icw. and thai of Willgcnstcin, Fc),crabcnd. and others,
there is noscicnufic \'OC'.Ibulary that is unproblematic or inde-
pendent of theory. So lhe ideal of the scientific language
proposed by Dr. Scg<IJI is a chimer'l. Kuhn (1970) also
relllarks thalscicntillc theories do not pl'm-ide a description
ofre:llil}' as such. so Illat b0111 metaphors and scientific lan-
guage Melude M the phenomena that the}' seck 10 explain or
describe.
The second alls\\cr is thai 1101 on I)' is there no pure sci-
l'ntific language, but cXI>CI;cncc (and our theorelical mod-
ell. of Rrealit)'M) cannot be conStrued \,'ithotll rcrourse to
Illelaplloricall,lIIgltage, asJohnsoll (1987) and others ha\'e
!>uggeslcd. In facl, Dr. Sc::gallmanifesis lhe impossibiliry of
his task when. ill the firs! page of his paper. he gh'es a lisl of
melaphors that describe Rprofound... fragmentauon,- but
fails 10 rcali7e lhal his apparclHl)' neulrall.erm -fragmenta-
tion - is ilSClf a meL'lphor. The mind is nOI Iiterall), a rhing
thai has fl.lglllellls, ahhough this lillguislic usage seems to
make sense to mOSI of liS.
The solution 10 01'. Se~lI's conundrum is not the sub-
stilUtiOll ofa Illelaphoricall;ulguage for a non-existent, pure-
l)'scielllificone, hUllhe COnl.inlled reminder that metaphors
and conSlructs are bUI approximalions and models. Their
\'llue depends on Lhe fUI1Ctions lhe)' serve, lheir coherence,
lheir abililY to explain obse"~ltions,and so on.
Despite lhese minor disagree men IS, I hope thar Dr.
Segall's fine paper will be read carefully and will help inte-
grate the fragrnelllcd ;l11d dichotOlnOllS thought pcrYdding
so much of this area (melaphor inlended).•
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